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Abstract
Background: When our PC goes on strike again we tend to curse it as if it were a human being. Why and under which
circumstances do we attribute human-like properties to machines? Although humans increasingly interact directly with
machines it remains unclear whether humans implicitly attribute intentions to them and, if so, whether such interactions
resemble human-human interactions on a neural level. In social cognitive neuroscience the ability to attribute intentions
and desires to others is being referred to as having a Theory of Mind (ToM). With the present study we investigated whether
an increase of human-likeness of interaction partners modulates the participants’ ToM associated cortical activity.
Methodology/Principal Findings: By means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (subjects n = 20) we investigated
cortical activity modulation during highly interactive human-robot game. Increasing degrees of human-likeness for the
game partner were introduced by means of a computer partner, a functional robot, an anthropomorphic robot and a
human partner. The classical iterated prisoner’s dilemma game was applied as experimental task which allowed for an
implicit detection of ToM associated cortical activity. During the experiment participants always played against a random
sequence unknowingly to them. Irrespective of the surmised interaction partners’ responses participants indicated having
experienced more fun and competition in the interaction with increasing human-like features of their partners. Parametric
modulation of the functional imaging data revealed a highly significant linear increase of cortical activity in the medial
frontal cortex as well as in the right temporo-parietal junction in correspondence with the increase of human-likeness of the
interaction partner (computer,functional robot,anthropomorphic robot,human).
Conclusions/Significance: Both regions correlating with the degree of human-likeness, the medial frontal cortex and the
right temporo-parietal junction, have been associated with Theory-of-Mind. The results demonstrate that the tendency to
build a model of another’s mind linearly increases with its perceived human-likeness. Moreover, the present data provides
first evidence of a contribution of higher human cognitive functions such as ToM in direct interactions with artificial robots.
Our results shed light on the long-lasting psychological and philosophical debate regarding human-machine interaction
and the question of what makes humans being perceived as human.
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Introduction
‘‘Can machines think?’’- This pivotal question was raised by Alan
Turing in 1950 however, philosophers debate this issue since the
early 17th century [1]. In the present study we address the related
question of whether humans implicitly think that machines can
think. More exactly, what would happen if machines behaved and
appeared human-like? Would, in such a scenario, humans ascribe
futuristic machines, as e.g. social, humanoid robots mental qualities
[2]?Would humans assign intention, volition and rational choices to
such humanoid robots and would attributions vary with the
perceived grade of human-likeness of the machine? In the first
place, von Kempelen approached these questions by introducing
the so-called ‘‘chess-turk’’ in 1769. The chess-turk incorporated a
life-size figure sitting in front of a chess-board while moving pieces
with its own hands. Spectators and opponents, however, were not
aware of that pieces were moved by a real human hidden inside the
box. Hence, the chess-turk was the first extensively documented
example of attributed intelligence to an anthropomorphic agent [3].
Besides principle theoretical interests in mental state attribution,
applied cognitive neurosciences have increasingly addressed this
issue. Inferring intentions, goals or desires of others is highly
advantageous for successful interpersonal communication. Further,
understanding and foreseeing the mental states of others and thus,
building a model of others’ minds, enables us to empathize but also
to manipulate the behaviour of conspecifics. In psychology the
ability to build a model of another’s mind has been referred to as
mentalizing or having a Theory of Mind (ToM) [4]. According to
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Saxe [5], humans intuitively conceive humans as having a mind and
attribute them contentful mental states, but does that account for
agents dissimilating human beings, as e.g. humanoid robots, too?
In general, mentalizing requires the ability to differentiate
animate and inanimate entities [6], to share attention by following
the gaze of another agent [7], to represent goal-directed actions [8]
and to distinguish between actions of the self and of others [9,10].
Sources of information about the inner states of another person
are behavioural patterns, such as eye gaze direction, body and
facial movements, which, in conjunction with the representation of
our own mental states, allow to infer the intentions of that agent
[11,12]. In recent years, neural correlates underlying mental state
attribution have been extensively investigated using a number of
different approaches: Studies investigating ToM by means of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) usually ask
participants to take the perspective of various stimuli types e.g.
cartoon characters [13–15], persons on a photograph [16], or even
geometrical shapes chasing each other [17]. However, for these
kinds of tasks, subjects are asked to evaluate ToM situations from
an explicit, and therefore highly controlled perspective.
In contrast, more recent neuroimaging studies focused on an
implicit detection of ToM by applying reciprocal interactive games
[18–24]. Here, tasks employed include variations of the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG), and others such as the
ultimatum game [19], stone-paper-scissor game [22], a coloured
disc pattern game [21] or economic decision games as e.g. Iowa
Gambling Task [23].
However, until now functional neuroimaging studies have only
concentrated on human game partners in comparison to computer
partners. Recent findings indicate that humans do attribute self-
generated actions, intentions and desires rather to human than to
computer partners, though activity in the mentalizing network was
detected in the human-computer interaction as well, especially
when the computer was perceived being directly responsive to the
human partner’s behavioural decisions [19,22].
The neural network associated with mentalizing comprises at
least two circumscribed brain regions: the right posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS) at the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) [12,14,25–29]. According to
Decety and colleagues the TPJ thereafter depicts a heteromodal
association cortex integrating input from lateral and posterior
thalamus while in turn holding reciprocal connections to the
prefrontal cortex and to the temporal lobes [30]. The TPJ is
considered as being sensitive to naturalistic biological motion and
human eye gaze observation [31], hence, affine to stimuli
signalling intentional activity [13]. Further, the distinction between
self-produced actions and actions generated by others, termed
agency, is linked with the TPJ and its vicinity [32–35]. The medial
prefrontal cortex (medPFC) and the adjacent paracingulate cortex
are activated when participants switch into the ‘‘view of the world’’
of another person and anticipate what a person is going to think,
feel or do by considering what he or she would think, feel or do
being in the same situation [12,36].
Referring to the above mentioned research question of whether
humans might attribute intention or agency to non-human
interactors and especially to non-human interactors that behave
and appear human-like, we engaged participants in a highly
interactive game scenario with four opponents, all hypothetically
differing linearly in the perceived grade of human-likeness (see
Fig. 1): a computer partner, a functionally designed LEGO
mindstorm robot, an anthropomorphic robot (BARTHOC Jr.)
and a human partner.
Human-likeness was operationalized by increasing degrees of
embodiment and anthropomorphism of game partners: embodi-
ment refers to the perception of a physical interaction as a
requirement to attribute intelligence to someone or something,
while anthropomorphism is described as the tendency to attribute
human characteristics to objects and animals in order to interpret
their actions in an understandable way. According to v. Foerster
humans anthropomorphize because that allows us to explain
things we do not understand in terms that we do understand, and
what we understand best is ourselves [37]. Consequently, Duffy
argues that robots need to have a certain degree of anthropomor-
phic attributes in order to allow for a meaningful social interaction
with a human being [38]. DiSalvo and colleagues speculate that
the degree to which people anthropomorphize depends on the
quantity of human attributes [39]. Therefore, the more human
attributes an artificial agent displays the more it is rated as human-
like and accordingly more people attribute human qualities to the
nonhuman agent [40].
The embodiment of a robot may also have an effect on the
human-likeness due to the feeling of social presence when
interacting with a robot. The feeling of social presence will be
enhanced by physical embodiment of an agent [41]. According to
Dautenhahn et al. robots have different relationships with the
world depending on their sensorimotor capabilities. Some robots
are more embodied than others because of their degree of
perturbatory bandwidth, i.e. the mutual perturbations between an
agent and its environment [42]. Therefore, the anthropomorphic
robot BARTHOC Jr. is able to perturb the social environment to
a greater extent than the functionally designed LEGO mindstorm
robot or the computer.
Regarding anthropomorphism, Epley and colleagues postulate
three factors that determine the extent to which people
anthropomorphize: (a) Elicited Agent Knowledge: Knowledge
about humans in general or self-knowledge serve as a basis for
induction primarily because such knowledge is acquired earlier
and is more richly detailed than knowledge about nonhuman
agents or objects. The more similar in appearance or motion the
nonhuman agent is the more people are likely to use themselves as
a source of induction. For example, robots are anthropomorphized
more readily when given human-like faces or bodies and
hummingbirds suddenly appear more deliberate and thoughtful
when their natural quickness is slowed to a human-like speed [43].
(b) Effectance Motivation: Effectance describes the need to interact
effectively with one’s environment. Attributing human character-
Figure 1. Arrangement of the briefing; from left to right in the
back: anthropomorphic robot (AR), computer partner (CP),
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istics and motivations to nonhuman agents increases the ability to
make sense of an agent’s action and reduces uncertainty. Finally,
(c) Sociality Motivation describes the need and desire to establish
social connections with other humans. When people feel lack of
social connection they anthropomorphize to a higher content to
satisfy their motivation to be together with others. The
physiognomy of a robot changes the perception of its human-
likeness, knowledge, and sociability. Therefore, people avoid
negatively behaving or looking robots and prefer to interact with
positive robots [44]. Furthermore, an expressive face indicating
attention [45] and imitating the face of a user [46] makes a robot
more compelling to interact with.
Especially as machines become fixtures at home and workplace,
our interactions with them will become more sophisticated and
inevitable. Within this context it has been proposed that social
robots serve as an interface between humans and technology with
the supposition that the more anthropomorphic a robot looks like
the more the user will expect the robot to behave like a human
being [47]. We assume that a human-like looking and behaving
robot is the easiest to use interface simply because humans are
highly skilled in having natural interaction with other humans. As
the form and appearance of robots has substantial influences on
the assumptions humans have about specific applications and
behaviours [48], four categories of robotic forms can be
differentiated: anthropomorphic, zoomorphic, caricatured, and
functional [49], with the functional form being farthest away from
human-likeness. Zoomorphic appearing robots are intended to
look like their animal counterparts to support the idea that an
observer expects the robot to behave like an animal. In some cases
this might be helpful to communicate the functional limitations of
a robot. For example, a dog is partly able to understand aspects of
human speech, but makes many mistakes. This mirrors the quality
of speech recognition software. Robots with a caricatured
appearance, however, are mainly designed both to not elicit any
familiar expectations and to focus on very specific attributes like
mouth or eyes.
Here we decided to fill the gap between the assumingly low end
of attributed mental states-a computer partner-and the obviously
high end-a real human partner-with the two robotic forms,
functional and anthropomorphic, postulated by Fong et al [49].
The present study focuses on two major questions: Firstly, do
humans attribute intentions and self-initiated, rational decisions to
robotic agents and secondly, do differing grades of human-likeness
of interactors mediate such mental state attributions? Therefore
we applied a version of the classical iterated PDG with subjects
instructed to play four mocked confederates. We assume that,
irrespective of the response behaviour of the interactors, which
unknowingly to the participants was randomized in advance,
participants would increasingly express fun playing the game,
engage in the interaction and suffer from loosing the more
interactors displayed human-like features (CP,FR,AR,HP; see
Fig. 2). Further, activity of the mentalizing network, i.e. the right
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex
(medPFC), was hypothesized to linearly increase with the
perceived grade of human-likeness of the interactors.
Materials and Methods
Twenty consenting healthy male subjects with an average age of
24.5 years (SD=2.97) took part in the study and were paid a fee
for participation. In order to control for possible cognitive factors
that may influence the performance on the task neuropsycholog-
ical testing comprising attention [50], executive functions [51] and
IQ [52] was administered. Participants were excluded if they had
been diagnosed with a past or present psychiatric, neurological, or
medical disease as well as with psycho-pharmacological medica-
tion intake at time of study or within the last two months.
According to the declaration of Helsinki the study was approved
by the local ethics committee.
Game scenario
Prior to scanning, participants were familiarized with the game
scenario and the mocked game partners of the present study. The
game resembled the scenario described in the classical iterated
prisoners’ dilemma (PDG) [53]. In this game two players are faced
with the same decision: cooperate with each other or defect. Both
players may gain a previously defined sum of points depending on
both, their own as well as their counterpart’s decision, i.e. left or
right button pressing. The dilemma eventuates such that a
unilateral (selfish) win of one player is maximised by defection,
whilst the counterpart cooperates, but punished bilaterally if both
players defect. Hence, relying on mutual cooperation – yielding
high shared earnings – comes along with the risk of being
deceived. The iterated PDG evokes a taking over of another’s
perspective and thereby allows to implicitly tap into ToM
processes. Depending on the interactor’s decision, the participant
immediately received the previously defined and explicitly learned
pay-off feedback, making the scenario highly interactive. In the
present study both contenders (participant and either CP, FR, AR
or HP; see Fig. 1) would be gratified with 20 points when
simultaneously pressing the left button (CC). Pressing the left
button (cooperation) with the respective partner pressing the right
button at the same time (defection), the further would return with
10 points for this game, while the latter receives 20 points (CD)
and vice versa (DC). In case both contenders choose to defect, the
dilemma eventuates with both sides receiving zero points (DD).
Figure 2. Surmised game partners (abbreviations) with increasing degrees in human-likeness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002597.g002
ToM on Robots
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CC implies mutual cooperation, while DD involves mutual non-
cooperation [19].
The decision matrix resembled matrices already applied by
other research groups [19,20,24] and was validated in a pre-test to
meet our criteria. Interactions with game partners were inter-
spersed by a low-level baseline condition enforcing participants to
alternately press the right and left button when a central crosshair
appeared on the computer screen. Importantly, the instruction
given to the participants involved the demand to both, ‘‘win a
series of games and reach a virtual highscore’’. As these two
converse goals could, per definition, not be reached by solely
pressing one button, this matrix secured an almost equal pressing
of both buttons, thereby supporting the idea behind: finding a
decision based upon the reasoning about the opponent’s last
decisions (‘I think that you think that I think…’), i.e. triggering
Theory of Mind processes.
Setting of the briefing
After introducing participants to their game partners (CP, FR,
AR and HP) for the upcoming game sessions, participants were
seated face-to-face with their interactors (see Fig. 1). All
participators had a commercial notebook located at their side of
the table. Via the notebook, which was placed in front of the
participant, the instruction of the experiment was displayed. A
mocked connecting cable linked the participant’s notebook with all
four notebooks of putative game partners.
For the briefing both robots were programmed in advance to
push their keyboard buttons exactly at the same time when the
participant believed to play them. Similarly, the confederate
(always the same male research associate S.G.) simultaneously
pressed his buttons when the subject assumed playing the human
partner. During the computer condition no movement was
noticeable. Furthermore, at the time of pausing, the anthropo-
morphic robot was programmed to orient towards the momen-
tarily playing ‘‘colleague’’ or the participant (Supporting Informa-
tion Video S1). However, during the tutorial as well as during the
entire experiment, the response behavior of all four game partners
(CP, FR, AR and HP) was randomized unknowingly to the
participant. By this means a real cooperation or search of ‘‘a best
way’’ was avoided.
According to theories on embodiment the functional robot was
designed to solely press buttons, while other human-like features
were totally omitted (see Fig. 3). The anthropomorphic robot
BARTHOC Jr. (Bielefeld Anthropomorphic RoboT for Human-
Oriented Communication) likewise fulfilled the criteria of
embodiment, thus furthermore displayed increased human-
likeness due to his anthropomorphic design:
a) The Functional Robot (FR). The functional robot with its
two arms (see Fig. 3) was constructed of two Lego Mindstorm sets
(http://mindstorms.lego.com). Each arm consists of two
servomotors and a Lego NXT controller (i.e. a computer
controlled Lego brick). The two servomotors are directly
connected to the NXT controller. The movements of the
servomotors are very precise (+/21u) so that a believable button
pressing animation on the computer keyboard is warranted. The
button pressing behavior was programmed with the Mindstorms
NXT software that serves as an intuitive drag and drop
programming software to design robots. The functional design
represents two arms modeled after a human arm to support the
idea of low human-likeness.
b) The Anthropomorphic Robot BARTHOC Jr.
BARTHOC Jr. looks like a child at the age of five years with
the size of 65 cm from the waist upward (see Fig. 3). The robot is
able to move its torso which is mounted on a 65 cm high chair like
socket to the left and to the right. The socket includes the power
supply, actuator controllers (so-called iModules), and two serial
interfaces to a computer. One interface controls the head and neck
actuators, the other one is connected to the actuators below the
neck. In total 41 actuators consisting of DC- and servomotors
navigate the robot. The face has ten degrees of freedom to control
jaw, mouth angles, eyes, eyebrows, and eyelids. The eyes are
vertically aligned and horizontally moveable. Furthermore, the
head can be turned, tilted to its side and slightly shifted forwards
and backwards. Each arm can be moved similar to the movements
of a human arm. With its five fingers on each hand BARTHOC
Jr. is able to show simple grips as well as deictic gestures.
However, note that the assumptions about the degree of
human-likeness of the used robots have not been verified
empirically as there are no reported methods so far, that allow
to determine the perceived degree of human-likeness evoked by an
artificial or natural entity.
At the beginning of each interaction, participants were informed
about their upcoming game partner by a picture, displayed on
their notebook screen. After 2000 ms the picture disappeared and
a central crosshair on the computer screen indicated the start of a
series and prompted the participants to find their decision (either
pressing the left or right keyboard button; see above). The central
crosshair disappeared after 1500 ms and was followed by an
accumulated pay-off feedback for the current series (1000 ms).
The accumulated pay-off feedback enabled participants to draw
exact inferences about the partner’s (i.e. CP, FR, AR or HP,
respectively) latest response selection. The participant’s pay-off was
indicated by the lower numbers, the game partner’s pay-off by the
upper numbers. During the low level baseline no numeral
Figure 3. A: Functional Robot, Lego Mindstorms; custom-made keyboard button system; B: Anthropomorphic Robot, BARTHOC Jr. (Bielefeld
Anthropomorphic RoboT for Human-Oriented Communication).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002597.g003
ToM on Robots
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response feedback was given. Instead two crosses replaced the
numbers on the upper and lower side of the bar.
The briefing pursued two goals: firstly, familiarizing participants
with the decision matrix and secondly, triggering a strong
attachment to their game partners.
fMRI setting
After the briefing the participant passed on to the MR-scanner
located in the adjacent room. The experimenter gave last
instructions and clarified that the participant understood the
winning matrix as well as the converse demand to both ‘‘win a
series and reach a virtual highscore’’. Confederate, robots and the
computer partner ‘‘remained seated’’ outside the scanner room.
The mocked connecting cable was reset and ‘‘connected’’ to the
MR presentation computer in the presence of the participant to
make them believe that they would really and directly interact with
all four game partners similar to the prior briefing session.
With the beginning of the functional imaging recording a
randomized script file (the experiment was performed using
PresentationH software; Version 0.70, www.neuro-bs.com) was
started with the projection of a condensed summary of the
instructions onto the MR-compatible video goggles (Resonance
Technology). The timing and setting of the fMRI session were the
same as during the briefing. Participants indicated their decision
(cooperation or defection) by pressing one of two buttons with their
right index finger on a fiberoptic custom-made response box. The
behavioural outcomes of each single game were recorded. A series of
nine games (i.e. one game equals one response) per condition (i.e. CP,
FR, AR, HP or control) completed one block. Overall, participants
played ten blocks per condition. After scanning participants were
asked to fill out a questionnaire about their impressions of the task and
game partners. In a debriefing participants were further interviewed
about their impressions about the ‘‘strategy use’’ of their putative
game partners as well as about their pleasure interacting with each
game partner. Finally, participants were informed about the mocked
scenario and the idea behind.
Image Acquisition
All scans were performed on a 3T whole body scanner (Phillips
Medical Systems, Achieva, Best, Netherlands) using standard
gradients and a standard quadrature head coil located at the
University Hospital Aachen. Subjects lay in the supine position,
while head movement was limited by foam padding within the
head coil. In order to ensure optimal visual acuity participants
were offered fMRI-compatible glasses that could be fixed to the
video goggles. For each subject, we acquired one series of 870 EPI-
scans. Stimuli were presented in a blocked design fashion, with ten
blocks per condition (CP, FR, AR, HP and control) and a block
length of nine single games (one game lasting 2500 ms).
Functional scans covered the whole brain, including five initial
dummy scans parallel to the AC/PC line with the following
parameters: NS=32; ST=3.5 mm; IG=3.75 mm; MS=64664;
FOV=1926192 mm; TR=2000 ms; TE=30 ms; FA=90u. For
anatomical localization, we acquired high resolution images with a
T1-weighted 3D FFE sequence (TR=25 ms; TE=4.59 ms;
NS=170 (sagital); ST=2 mm; IG=1 mm; FOV=2566256 mm;
voxel size = 16162 mm). MR images were analyzed using
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM5, ww.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) imple-
mented in MATLAB 7.0 (Mathworks Inc., Sherborn, MA, USA).
Image analysis
After discarding the first five volumes, all images were realigned
to the first image to correct for head movement. Unwarping was
used to correct for the interaction of susceptibility artifacts and
head movement. Volumes were then normalized into standard
stereotaxic anatomical MNI-space by using the transformation
matrix calculated from the first EPI-scan of each subject and the
EPI-template. Afterwards, the normalized data with a resliced
voxel size of 46464 mm was smoothed with an 8 mm FWHM
isotropic Gaussian kernel to accommodate for inter-subject
variation in brain anatomy. A general linear model (GLM)
comprising four conditions (CP, FR, AR, HP) was specified for
each participant. Based on the hypothesis of a linear increase of
cortical activity with respect to the perceived degree of human-
likeness we calculated a parametric modulation of functional
images (i.e. CP modelled as 1, FR as 2, AR as 3 and finally HP as
4). An SPM5 group analysis was performed by entering these
contrast images into random effects analyses using one-sample t-
tests. The resulting group contrasts comprised CP.Control,
FR,Control, AR,Control, HP,Control, the linear increase
(CP,FR,AR,HP) and the parametric modulation. For all
group analyses, we applied a voxel-wise threshold of p,0.05
(family wise error corrected) and a minimum cluster size of 10
coherent voxels.
Parameter estimates were extracted by moving the centre of
ROI (ROI-radius = 10 mm) on the first-level (subject level) to the
individual local maximum activation within the respective clusters
of interest (i.e. TPJ, medFG, medPFG and Precuneus; see results
section). Extracted betas then were averaged across subjects for
each condition (CP, FR, AR and HP) vs. Control.
The reported voxel coordinates of activation peaks were
transformed from MNI space to Talairach & Tournoux atlas space
[54] by non-linear transformations (www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk).
Results
Behavioral results
As a prerequisite to derive meaningful interpretations of the
behavioral and functional imaging data on-line response behav-
iour and questionnaires indicated that all of the 20 participants
believed in the setting, i.e. they believed to really interact with the
partners on-line.
Neither reaction times nor button pressing behaviour differed
significantly between conditions (reaction times: F(1,19) = .07;
p= .98; button pressing behaviour: F(1,19) = .26; p= .85). Overall,
participants played rather competitive with a ratio of around 60/
40 (competitive/cooperative) decisions, irrespective of the partner
being played.
In the debriefing questionnaire, fun, intelligence, competitiveness
and sympathy towards the players was evaluated. Participants
indicated having experienced linearly increasing fun in the
interaction the more the respective partner exhibited human-like
features, i.e. CP,FR,AR,HP (linear trend of perceived fun:
F(1,19) = 19.06; p,.0001). Similarly, game partners were attributed
increasing intelligence the more they appeared human-like (linear
trend of attributed intelligence: F(1,19) = 9.21; p,.005). For both
calculations, quadratic and cubic trends did not reach significance.
Regarding the perceived competitiveness of game partners, an
ANOVA did not yield significant results. However, post-hoc paired
samples t-tests revealed that BARTHOC Jr.’s response behaviour
was witnessed as being more competitive than the computer’s and
functional robot’s behaviour (BARTHOC Jr. vs. computer, paired
samples t-test: t=2.46; p,.05; BARTHOC Jr. vs. functional robot,
paired samples t-test: t=2.99; p,.01). Human opponent and
BARTHOC Jr. were rated as equally competitive (BARTHOC Jr.
vs. human partner, paired samples t-test: t=21.00; p= .33).
Relative to their own game behaviour, subjects perceived
themselves as being similarly competitive as the human opponent
ToM on Robots
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as well as BARTHOC Jr., however the computer partner and the
functional robot were regarded as significantly less competitive (self-
assessment vs. computer partner and functional robot, respectively,
paired samples t-tests: t=2.27; p,.05; t=2.67; p,.05).
Overall, there was a significant difference in the self-estimated
sensation between winning (positively valued) and loosing series
(negatively valued), irrespective of the actual game partner (paired
samples t-tests: computer partner: t=9.45; p,.0001; functional
robot: t=7.86; p,.0001; anthropomorphic robot: t=8.03;
p,.0001; human partner: t=10.80; p,.0001).
Finally, human-likeness and sympathy were rated only for
BARTHOC Jr. and the functional robot. Participants evaluated
BARTHOC Jr.’s appearance as significantly more human-like as
the functional robot (paired samples t-test: t=9.28; p,.0001) and
there was a trend towards appreciating BARTHOC Jr. as more
sympathetic and friendly compared to the functional robot (paired
samples t-test: t=1.88; p,.10).
Importantly, all of these evaluations must be ascribed to the
different appearance of game partners as their response behaviour
was, unknowingly to the participants, purely random (see methods
section). Interestingly, some participants directly anthropomor-
phized BARTHOC Jr. during the briefing by talking to him or
insulting him (‘‘this X always knows what I am playing’’). After the
fMRI scanning, participants spontaneously re-interacted with the
human confederate (e.g. congratulated or provocatively teased
him) and sometimes even with BARTHOC Jr. (e.g. by waving the
hand). However, no such interactions occurred with respect to the
functional robot or the computer partner.
Neuroimaging results
Simple contrasts. Comparing each condition (CP, FR, AR
and HP) with control yielded significant and concordant activation
clusters located in the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and
the Precuneus (see Fig. 4; FWE corrected at p,.05). The cluster
size of activation within the right temporo-parietal junction
increased with human-likeness of the game partners. Similarly,
activation of the medial prefrontal gyrus (AR,Control;
HP,Control) extending into the medial frontal gyrus
(FR,Control; AR,Control; HP,Control) and bilateral dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (FR,Control; AR,Control;
HP,Control) manifested only for the more human-like game
partners (see Fig. 4; Table 1). The human condition yielded
strongest and most extended activation spreads, including all
cortical regions detected within the three other comparisons.
Regarding parameter estimates within all four regions (i.e. TPJ,
medFG, medPFG and Precuneus) the results exhibit a significant
linear trend corresponding to the perceived degree of human-
likeness of game partners (linear trend of beta values for TPJ:
F(1,76) = 20,85; p,.0001; linear trend of beta values for medFG:
F(1,76) = 18,30; p,.0001; linear trend of beta values for medPFG:
F(1,76) = 26,59; p,.0001; linear trend of beta values for
Precuneus: F(1,76) = 18,67; p,.0001; see Fig. 5). Quadratic and
cubic trends did not reach significance.
Parametric modulation
Activity related to the parametric modulation (modelled as
CP= 1; FR=2; AR=3; HP=4) yielded highly significant
activation clusters in two regions: the right temporo-parietal
junction [BA 39/40, coordinates: x = 55, y =253, z = 21; t = 6.83]
and the medial frontal gyrus [BA 8, coordinates: x = 8, y= 45,
z = 49; t = 4.49], both of which constitute the classic ToM network
(see Table 1; Fig. 6). An opposite modelling, termed ‘‘counter-
anthropomorphism’’ (i.e. (modelled parametrically as CP= 4;
FR=3; AR=2; HP=1), did not yield any significant activation,
even by applying a more liberal t-threshold.
Discussion
The objective of the present study was to investigate human-
machine interaction and the impact of human-likeness on mental
state attribution to someone or something. Especially in view of the rise
of human-robot interactions in near future (e.g. application as
caretaker, nurse, soldier, sex worker etc.), the present study sheds
light onto the question of how humans perceive robotic machines.
In the introduction we questioned whether humans think that
‘‘machines can think’’? Would humans ascribe futuristic machines,
as e.g. social, humanoid robots mental qualities? These questions
are also important with respect to robotic design. One important
question in the design of dialog modelling is how to communicate
the internal system state of a robot in a way that is understandable
to the human user? In order to successfully interact with a robot a
human user must have a rough understanding of how the robot
‘‘thinks’’. Thus, do human subjects attribute similar reasoning
processes to a robot as they would to another human being? If so,
what factors play a role in this attribution? The answers to these
questions will heavily influence the way robots’ physical and
‘‘mental’’ behaviour are designed in the future.
With a mocked highly interactive game scenario confronting
human participants with four interaction partners – a computer, a
functionally designed robot, an anthropomorphic robot and a
human confederate – we could demonstrate that participants
increasingly engaged cortical regions corresponding to the classical
Theory-of-Mind network the more the respective game partners
exhibited human-like features.
Thus, the same cortical network contributing to mental state
attribution in implicit human-human interactions, i.e. right
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) at the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), was
activated in the human-machine interactions. These findings were
highly robust and could not be explained by behavioural or
strategic alliances during the game as the response behaviour of all
putative opponents was, unknowingly to the participants, ran-
domized in advance. Thus pure intentional stance could be
assessed, i.e. the disposition to treat an entity as a rational agent,
possessing particular beliefs, desires and intentions [22,55].
Further, as the game scenario of the current study equalled
classical iterated Prisoner Dilemma Game (PDG) matrices,
mentalizing performance was measured implicitly thereby cir-
cumventing socially desirable behaviour [18–20,24,25].
Regarding the participants’ behaviour, the way participants
interacted and treated all four game partners totally supported the
high ecological validity of the study design. Notably, none of the
20 participants indicated having seen through the mocked setting.
Quite the contrary, participants applied similar strategies for all
four opponents as documented by the same ratio of competitive/
cooperative decisions, while the time of response selection did not
differ between interaction partners. Further, behavioural indices
clearly documented the hypothesized direction of the effect of
human-likeness: the more a game partner exhibited human-like
features (CP,FR,AR,HP) the more the participants indicated
having enjoyed the interaction and the more they attributed
intelligence to their opponent.
Compared directly, participants rated the anthropomorphic
robot as being more competitive and less cooperative as opposed
to the functional robot and the computer. Interestingly, the
putative human partner and the anthropomorphic robot were not
perceived differently with respect to competitiveness. Further, a
ToM on Robots
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trend revealed the anthropomorphic relative to the functional
robot as being more sympathetic and pleasant to interact with.
Accordingly, the appearance of the anthropomorphic robot was
valued as more human-like and wins against him evoked more
positive feelings compared to winning against the functional robot
or the computer. These findings are fascinating with respect to the
fact that all game partners solely played random sequences: hence,
any differences in evaluations must be attributed to their differing
appearance.
To be able to interpret and place the results of the current fMRI
study into a broader context, the results of research documenting
similar ToM effects based solely on computer or human opponents
had been replicated in our setting [19,20,24]. Contrasting each of
the four experimental conditions with control, basic ToM network
activity (i. e. right temporo-parietal junction) could be detected for
each comparison. However, only the anthropomorphic robot
BARTHOC Jr. and the human partner elicited additional medial
prefrontal gyrus activation at a more conservative statistical
threshold. However, lowering the applied threshold yielded to
medial prefrontal gyrus activations in the computer and functional
robot condition as well, thus validating recent findings on human-
computer interactions [19,20,24]. Another reason for the somehow
smaller activation cluster in the medial frontal cortex could be the
nature of the iterated PDG. Previous studies documented medPFG
activity to be rather associated with competitive than cooperative
behaviour [21]. The game matrix and instruction of the current
study, however, was fitted to yield a levelled out playing. With a
cooperation rate of 40% (compared to rates of 10–20% in other
studies) the lower recruitment of the medial prefrontal cortex might
be explained. The Precuneus activation detected in all comparisons
is supposed to relate to mental imagery, self-processing operations
and experience of agency [13,56,57].
Regarding the parametric modulation of the functional imaging
data the perceived increase of human-likeness of game partners
Figure 4. Regions activated more strongly during CP, FR, AR or HP as opposed to control. The activation map (p,0.05, family wise error
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Table 1. Activation peaks with their localization.
BA Coordinates t-value No. voxels
x y Z
Computer Partner.Control
Right Superior Parietal Lobule 40 36 260 51 5.61 664
46 252 52 5.55
55 252 41 5.09
Precuneus 7 8 273 52 4.86 21
Functional Robot.Control
Right Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 46 254 52 5.83 1123
50 240 52 5.69
55 254 41 5.67
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 46/10 44 48 22 5.19 55
Left Inferior/Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 240 50 23 5.11 43
Precuneus 7 8 273 52 4.72 29
Anthropomorphic Robot.Control
Right Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 48 252 50 6.10 1206
46 243 41 5.91
53 251 38 5.37
Precuneus 7 8 275 50 7.19 39
Medial Frontal Gyrus 8 2 33 39 6.80 32
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 238 52 21 6.62 17
Human Partner.Control
Right Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 36 258 43 6.95 2602
53 252 39 6.64
53 241 35 6.25
Right Superior Frontal Gyrus 40 38 50 20 5.57 856
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 34 57 10 5.15
24 59 19 4.90
Medial Frontal Gyrus/Anterior Cingulate Gyrus 6/9/32 2 38 29 5.53 586
Medial Frontal Gyrus 8 4 31 41 5.34
Medial Frontal Gyrus 8/9 8 55 41 5.22
Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 11 236 46 214 5.50 11
Precuneus 7 6 271 51 5.41 372
10 268 42 5.26
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 234 58 3 5.28 87
234 49 5 4.57
Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 4 30 57 5.18 48
Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus 13/47 234 21 211 5.14 84
Right Superior Temporal Gyrus 38/47 53 19 213 4.98 174
Right Superior Frontal Gyrus 6/8 20 22 58 4.91 85
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 6/8 28 18 54 4.75
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 46 246 42 18 4.56 14
Humanlikeness (CP,FR,AR,HP)
Right Temporo-Parietal Junction 39 55 253 21 6.83 313
Right Angular Gyrus 40 51 266 35 5.78
Right Superior Medial Frontal Gyrus 8 8 45 49 4.49 29
Significance level and the size of the respective activation cluster (number of voxels) for CP, FR, AR and HP as opposed to control (p,0.05, family wise error corrected,
minimal cluster size 10 voxels) and parametric modulation of human-likeness, i.e. CP,FR,AR,HP (p,0.05, family wise error corrected, minimal cluster size 10 voxels).
Coordinates are listed in Talairach and Tournoux (1988) atlas space. BA is the Brodmann area nearest to the coordinate and should be considered approximate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002597.t001
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correlated significantly with only two cortical regions: the right
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex
(medPFC), both areas constitute the classical mentalizing network.
The TPJ contributes to processing naturalistic biological motion,
human eye gaze observation [31] and plays a significant role in
distinguishing self-/other-produced actions, termed agency [32–35].
According to Decety and co-workers the TPJ in conjunction with
medPFC is activated when we distinguish the perspectives of the self
from others, a finding perfectly displayed by the results of the present
study [58]. Hence, we speculate that participants increasingly
attributed agency to their game partners the more they exhibited
human-like features. Most prominently agency is attributed to
humans, but also inanimate objects [59] or even moving shapes
[17] are regarded as exhibiting self-initiated actions [12]. Further-
more, mental simulations of their respective game partners actions
(i.e. button pressing behaviour as observed during the briefing) likely
contributed to the observed strong TPJ activity [60].
With respect to the linear increase of medial prefrontal cortex
(medPFC) activation, we propose that ‘‘switching into the world’’
of the respective game partner succeeded easier the more human-
like the game partner was perceived and therefore yielded stronger
activations. Thus, anticipating what an agent is going to do next by
considering what he or she would do being in the same situation
also accounts for non-human partners [12,36]. Rilling and
colleagues chose the same line of reasoning for their human-
computer interactions suggesting that either these brain regions
contribute to reasoning about unobservable states of nonhuman
systems, or that participants imbued their computer partners with
human attributes (Rilling 2004).
As the medial prefrontal cortex activation detected in the
present study was located at the dorsal and most posterior portion
of the prefrontal cortex we propose that this region functions as an
integration site bridging mental state attribution of similar/
familiar to dissimilar/unknown others, thus human-likeness. This
position is supported by recent studies reporting activity increases
of the most inferior region of the medPFC during perspective
taking of similar others [59], while dissimilar and unknown others
rather activated the dorsal and most posterior region of the
medPFC [12,27].
Implications and Conclusion of the study
To summarize the present study provides first evidence that the
degree of human-likeness of a counterpart modulates its
perception, influences the communication and behaviour, biases
‘‘mental’’ state attribution and, finally, affects cortical activity
during such interactions. Here we show that this modulation is
linear, thus the more a vis-a-vis agent or entity exhibits human-like
features, the more we build a model of its ‘‘mind’’. This process
occurs irrespective of its behavioural responses and independently
of whether we interact with real human partners or ‘‘just’’
machines. Returning to the question raised in the introduction, we
would argue that humans implicitly ascribe automated machines,
such as e.g. humanoid robots mental states, though on a lower
level. However, as behaviour (embodiment) and appearance
(anthropomorphism) modulate the degree of human-likeness one
could speculate that with the rise of robotic development perfectly
humanoid robots are being constructed (as e.g. Repliee Q1Expo).
The findings also allow the conclusion that humans are able to
Figure 5. Averaged parameter estimates (beta values) for each condition derived from the individual local maxima activations
(TPJ = temporo-parietal junction; medFG=medial frontal gyrus; medPFG=medial prefrontal gyrus; Precuneus).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002597.g005
ToM on Robots
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 July 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 7 | e2597
perceive how ‘‘human-like’’ a robot is and that a less human-like
looking robot might thus follow processing strategies that are alien
to the human. This finding would thus suggest that the exterior of
a robot should mirror its interior in that a more human-like
looking robot should exhibit also more human-like behaviour.
To note, the present data do not provide any hints which
particular morphological feature of the (robotic) interactors is
crucial to ascribe a ToM. Future studies will need to address this
issue in a more detailed way. However, as we hypothesised above,
the degree of human-likeness might determine ToM.
Thus, we expect the results of our study to have an impact on
long-lasting psychological and philosophical debates regarding
human-machine interactions. Moreover, the findings of the
present study will affect the designing of robots that are utilized
for direct human-robot interactions. Finally, as psychiatric patients
with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have interestingly been
found to prefer robotic to human partners in an initial interaction,
though exhibit profound impairments in general mentalizing
ability [25], it is possible that this patient group might have
facilitated mentalizing when engaging with robotic relative to
human interactors. Testing this hypothesis will have great
importance for the clinical application of humanoid robots in
ASD therapy.
As human-robot communication will play a key role in future
(as prophesized in media reports, e.g. ‘‘the robot revolution is upon
us’’ [61]), the present study may help to integrate theory and
research from neuroscience and social robotics in order to place
this work in a broader conceptual framework and promote synergy
across fields.
Supporting Information
Video S1 Setting of the briefing.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002597.s001 (3.37 MB
MOV)
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